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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260730T200000
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UID:251-1785441600-1785447000@imperfectlycurious.com
SUMMARY:Death\, Dying\, and the Myth of Being Special
DESCRIPTION:Death is the one appointment none of us can cancel\, reschedule\, or pretend got lost in the spam folder. Yet for something so certain\, it remains strangely difficult to talk about. We avoid it\, joke about it\, medicalise it\, spiritualise it\, fear it\, romanticise it\, and occasionally turn it into prestige television. This event invites us to look directly\, but gently\, at mortality: not simply as an ending\, but as a lens through which questions of identity\, freedom\, love\, inequality\, justice\, courage\, grief\, and meaning come sharply into focus. \nHow does the knowledge that life is finite influence the choices we make\, the risks we take\, and the relationships we value? In what ways does death challenge our ideas of fairness\, especially when lives are cut short by illness\, violence\, poverty\, or neglect? Can reflecting on mortality help us live more freely\, or does it burden us with anxiety and regret? If our memories\, bodies\, beliefs\, and desires change over time\, what exactly is the “self” whose death we fear? How do grief\, love\, and attachment reveal what matters most to us\, and can the pain of loss ever become part of a meaningful life? Is death best understood as a harm\, a natural limit\, a mystery\, a liberation\, or simply a fact around which human beings build stories? And if there are no easy answers\, what might it mean to face mortality with honesty\, compassion\, humour\, and care? \n\nNo prior philosophical qualification required – just curiosity\, a willingness to listen\, and an openness to multiple ways of knowing. \nThe meetup sessions often consists of the following: \n\nCheery welcomes to familiar faces and those that feel like chatting.\nA presentation about the topic\, lasts between 15-25 minutes (more or less). This is a way to provide some fundamentals.\nOpen floor to people that put up their hands to contribute their thoughts\, should they want to.\nA teary farewell as the clock announces a sad completion of the session; well-wishing until we all meet again.\n\n\nAlright folks! I want to give a little disclaimer – I’m not claiming to be an expert on the topics we’ll be discussing. My aim is to create a judgment-free zone where attendees can share thoughts and experiences openly. \nLet’s approach our conversations with open minds and a sense of curiosity\, knowing that we each bring unique backgrounds and perspectives. Please feel encouraged to express yourself in ways that reflect who you are\, and let’s all keep in mind that our words carry meaning for those around us. The intention of the meetup is to learn from one another\, so if anyone feels uncomfortable or misunderstood at any point\, please don’t hesitate to speak up. This way\, we can address things together and make sure everyone feels valued and included. \nThe goal is to explore ideas collaboratively\, without promoting any particular viewpoint. We may not find simple answers to the questions we face\, but by approaching them with empathy\, respect\, and inclusivity\, we can gain new insights and work towards positive change. \nLove our discussions? Show your support with a book or cup of coffee! Visit BuyMeACoffee (https://buymeacoffee.com/imperfectlycurious) to help fuel our passion for philosophy and books. Every contribution helps cover the costs of hosting\, reading\, and sharing ideas together. \n\n\nhttps://us06web.zoom.us/j/81245429962?pwd=r09HWyakQAsVE5qSFMNrFRy8LsUA2K.1
URL:https://imperfectlycurious.com/event/death-dying-and-the-myth-of-being-special/
CATEGORIES:The Curious Conversation Club
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://bunny-wp-pullzone-jmfclxdp7w.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/meetup-1.png
ORGANIZER;CN="Imperfectly Curious":MAILTO:info@imperfectlycurious.com
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260725T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260725T190000
DTSTAMP:20260723T141052Z
CREATED:20260719T195716Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260723T141052Z
UID:538-1785002400-1785006000@imperfectlycurious.com
SUMMARY:Five Seats Infinite Questions - 25th July 2026
DESCRIPTION:An intentionally small weekly online meetup for relaxed\, thoughtful philosophical conversation. \nEach event is built around 1-3 questions\, suggested by attendees or chosen by the host. We’ll explore the question until boredom or irritation intervenes. \nThe question list will be posted in the event comments on the Thursday before the meetup\, so everyone has time to think it over. \nThe group is intentionally small: around five open attendee places\, plus a small core group. The aim is to create a friendly space where everyone can take part\, rather than disappear into a sea of muted rectangles. \nNo expertise is needed. You do not need fully formed opinions\, prior reading\, or a working relationship with Kant\, Hegel\, or Heidegger. Half-formed thoughts\, tentative objections\, and “I’m not sure\, but…” are very welcome. \nThis is not a lecture\, debate club\, or name-dropping contest. Just bring curiosity\, kindness\, and a willingness to think out loud. \nThe goal is a good conversation\, not a final answer.
URL:https://imperfectlycurious.com/event/five-seats-infinite-questions-25th-july-2026/
CATEGORIES:Five Seats Infinite Questions
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://bunny-wp-pullzone-jmfclxdp7w.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/meetup.png
ORGANIZER;CN="Imperfectly Curious":MAILTO:info@imperfectlycurious.com
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260718T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260718T190000
DTSTAMP:20260717T104717Z
CREATED:20260716T171827Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260717T104717Z
UID:467-1784397600-1784401200@imperfectlycurious.com
SUMMARY:Five Seats Infinite Questions - 18th July 2026
DESCRIPTION:An intentionally small weekly online meetup for relaxed\, thoughtful philosophical conversation. \nEach event is built around 1-3 questions\, suggested by attendees or chosen by the host. We’ll explore the question until boredom or irritation intervenes. \nThe question list will be posted in the event comments on the Thursday before the meetup\, so everyone has time to think it over. \nThe group is intentionally small: around five open attendee places\, plus a small core group. The aim is to create a friendly space where everyone can take part\, rather than disappear into a sea of muted rectangles. \nNo expertise is needed. You do not need fully formed opinions\, prior reading\, or a working relationship with Kant\, Hegel\, or Heidegger. Half-formed thoughts\, tentative objections\, and “I’m not sure\, but…” are very welcome. \nThis is not a lecture\, debate club\, or name-dropping contest. Just bring curiosity\, kindness\, and a willingness to think out loud. \nThe goal is a good conversation\, not a final answer. \n\n\nThis week’s ponderings:\n\n\n\nThe Final Witness\n\nCan we claim to know the truth about the past if all living witnesses to an event choose to remain silent or offer conflicting accounts? \nScenario \nA small\, isolated village has maintained a perfect record of its history for two centuries through a strictly enforced oral tradition\, where every event is verified by an assembly of elders. One day\, it is discovered that the entire written archive of the village—all primary source documents—was fabricated by a single disgruntled historian fifty years ago. \nThe elders\, who were children when the fabrication occurred\, now face a crisis. They can continue to teach the ‘official’ history\, which has successfully guided the village’s moral life for decades\, or they can reveal the forgery\, effectively erasing the shared narrative that provides the community with its sense of belonging and purpose. \n\nDoes the utility of a history determine its truth?\nIf a story is universally accepted and provides social cohesion\, does the lack of factual accuracy matter?\nAre we obligated to dismantle a false narrative if it is the foundation of our current identity?\n\n“History is a set of lies agreed upon.”— Napoleon Bonaparte \n\n\n\nThe Unintended Architect\n\nTo what extent are we morally responsible for the long-term outcomes of our actions when those outcomes are entirely unforeseen and disconnected from our original intent? \nScenario \nA climate scientist develops a new\, highly efficient method for cleaning industrial water\, which is hailed globally as a massive environmental success. The process is cheap\, simple\, and adopted by every major factory on the planet\, drastically improving water quality for billions of people. \nTwenty years later\, it is revealed that a unique byproduct of this purification process has been slowly\, invisibly altering the chemical balance of the upper atmosphere\, causing a catastrophic shift in global weather patterns that cannot be reversed. The scientist acted with pure\, altruistic motives and followed all established safety protocols at the time. \n\nCan a person be a hero and a villain simultaneously?\nDoes moral culpability require the foresight of consequences?\nShould we judge the scientist by their initial intent or the eventual impact of their work?\n\n“The path to hell is paved with good intentions.”— Saint Bernard of Clairvaux \n\n\n\nThe Sculpted Self\n\nIf you could surgically remove the personality traits you dislike\, would you still be the same person? \nScenario \nA medical clinic offers a ‘character-sculpting’ procedure that allows individuals to permanently delete traits they find problematic—such as impatience\, social anxiety\, or a propensity for anger—and replace them with more desirable attributes like calmness or resilience. \nYou meet a person who has undergone this process several times over a decade. They are now objectively more successful\, happier\, and easier to be around than the version of them you knew years ago. When you try to reminisce about a shared\, difficult experience that shaped your friendship\, they cannot understand the emotional weight you are placing on it\, as they no longer possess the temperament that made that experience so formative. \n\nDoes the ‘authentic’ self exist\, or is it merely the sum of our current traits?\nIf you remove your flaws\, do you also lose the capacity to value your virtues?\nAt what point does personal improvement become the destruction of the original person?\n\n“Character is fate.”— Heraclitus \n\n\n\n\n\nhttps://imperfectlycurious.com/zoom/fsiq-20260718
URL:https://imperfectlycurious.com/event/five-seats-infinite-questions-18th-july-2026/
CATEGORIES:Five Seats Infinite Questions
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://bunny-wp-pullzone-jmfclxdp7w.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/meetup.png
ORGANIZER;CN="Imperfectly Curious":MAILTO:info@imperfectlycurious.com
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260711T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260711T190000
DTSTAMP:20260710T203059Z
CREATED:20260709T123416Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260710T203059Z
UID:398-1783792800-1783796400@imperfectlycurious.com
SUMMARY:Five Seats Infinite Questions - 11th July 2026
DESCRIPTION:An intentionally small weekly online meetup for relaxed\, thoughtful philosophical conversation. \nEach event is built around 1-3 questions\, suggested by attendees or chosen by the host. We’ll explore the question until boredom or irritation intervenes. \nThe question list will be posted in the event comments on the Thursday before the meetup\, so everyone has time to think it over. \nThe group is intentionally small: around five open attendee places\, plus a small core group. The aim is to create a friendly space where everyone can take part\, rather than disappear into a sea of muted rectangles. \nNo expertise is needed. You do not need fully formed opinions\, prior reading\, or a working relationship with Kant\, Hegel\, or Heidegger. Half-formed thoughts\, tentative objections\, and “I’m not sure\, but…” are very welcome. \nThis is not a lecture\, debate club\, or name-dropping contest. Just bring curiosity\, kindness\, and a willingness to think out loud. \nThe goal is a good conversation\, not a final answer. \n\n\nOnline Meetup Link:See https://www.meetup.com/exeter-philosophy-meetup-group/events/314993726/ \n\n\nThe topics for the week are: \n\n\n\nMore or Less\n\nWhen money can improve lives\, should we use it to help as many people as possible — or to make fewer lives much better? \nImagine a wealthy donor who wants to help a struggling community. One plan would reach a very large number of people\, giving each of them a modest improvement: cleaner water\, slightly better food\, more reliable electricity\, or basic healthcare. \nAnother plan would help far fewer people\, but much more deeply. It might lift a smaller group out of poverty altogether\, fund proper education\, create lasting jobs\, or give families a real chance to flourish rather than merely survive. \nBoth choices seem good. The first spreads benefit widely; the second transforms lives more profoundly. One treats money as a way of reducing the largest amount of suffering across the greatest number of people. The other asks whether a life barely improved is really the best we can hope for. \nThis is the dilemma behind Baggini’s More or Less. It asks whether we should judge moral and financial decisions by total benefit\, by average quality of life\, by the number of people helped\, or by the depth of the help given. \nA recent Reuters report gives the question global urgency. The United Nations warned that the world faces a $4 trillion annual financing gap if it is to meet the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. The report noted that there have been major gains in access to electricity\, water and healthcare\, but also that many targets are moving too slowly or going backwards. Hundreds of millions remain chronically hungry\, many children and young people remain out of school\, and extreme poverty is not disappearing quickly enough. \nFinance\, then\, is not just about markets\, profit or growth. It is also about moral allocation. Every budget\, aid package\, investment plan or development target quietly asks: who should be helped\, by how much\, and according to what measure of success? \nShould money be used where it produces the greatest total improvement\, even if each individual benefit is modest? Or should it be concentrated where it can give fewer people a much better life? Is the purpose of finance to maximise measurable outcomes — or to make human flourishing possible? \nAnd if we can count money more easily than we can count dignity\, security\, hope or happiness\, are we in danger of mistaking what is measurable for what matters most? \n“It is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong.”Jeremy Bentham – A Fragment on Government \nSource:https://www.reuters.com/world/world-must-close-4-trillion-annual-funding-gap-reach-development-goals-un-says-2026-07-07/ \n\n\n\nPicasso on the Beach\n\nIs a work of art less valuable if it does not endure\, or can its fleeting nature make it more precious? \nPicture yourself walking along a beach when you see Pablo Picasso drawing a remarkable image in the sand. It is unmistakably his work: inventive\, beautiful\, alive with artistic force. But the tide is coming in. Within minutes\, the sea will wash it away forever. \nYou cannot preserve the drawing itself. At best\, you might take a photograph. Should you feel devastated that a genuine Picasso will vanish? Or is the fact that it was brief\, fragile\, and experienced in the moment part of what gives it its value? \nPaintings\, sculptures\, and buildings are often treated as objects to be protected from decay. But performances\, songs\, and moments of beauty disappear naturally. Perhaps not all art is meant to last. Perhaps our urge to preserve it says as much about our fear of loss as it does about artistic value. \n“The work of art is complete only as it works in the experience of others.”John Dewey – Art as Experience  \n\n\n\nBeam Me Up\n\nIf a perfect copy of you wakes up somewhere else\, have you survived — or has someone new taken your place? \nImagine a future in which travel from Earth to Mars no longer takes months. Instead\, you step into a teletransporter booth. The machine scans every cell in your body\, records the exact state of your brain\, destroys the original\, and sends the information across space. \nA few moments later\, a body is reconstructed on Mars. It has your memories\, your personality\, your habits\, your scars\, your private jokes\, your fears\, and your plans. From the inside\, the person on Mars feels as though they simply stepped into a machine on Earth and woke up somewhere else. \nTo everyone else\, the journey looks like a complete success. Your family recognises you. You remember your life. You continue your projects. You insist that you are still you. \nBut then a troubling thought appears. The machine did not move your body through space. It destroyed it and built a replacement. Perhaps the person on Mars is not you at all\, but a perfect successor: someone who continues your life without being the same person who entered the booth. \nWould stepping into the teletransporter be a form of travel\, or a form of suicide? Is personal identity a matter of having the same body\, the same memories\, the same consciousness\, or the same continuing story? And if nobody\, including the person who arrives\, can tell the difference\, should the difference still matter? \n“Identity is not what matters.”Derek Parfit – Reasons and Persons
URL:https://imperfectlycurious.com/event/five-seats-infinite-questions-11th-july-2026/
CATEGORIES:Five Seats Infinite Questions
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://bunny-wp-pullzone-jmfclxdp7w.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/meetup.png
ORGANIZER;CN="Imperfectly Curious":MAILTO:info@imperfectlycurious.com
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260704T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260704T190000
DTSTAMP:20260702T081206Z
CREATED:20260702T080008Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260702T081206Z
UID:354-1783188000-1783191600@imperfectlycurious.com
SUMMARY:Five Seats Infinite Questions - 4th July 2026
DESCRIPTION:An intentionally small weekly online meetup for relaxed\, thoughtful philosophical conversation. \nEach event is built around 1-3 questions\, suggested by attendees or chosen by the host. We’ll explore the question until boredom or irritation intervenes. \nThe question list will be posted in the event comments on the Thursday before the meetup\, so everyone has time to think it over. \nThe group is intentionally small: around five open attendee places\, plus a small core group. The aim is to create a friendly space where everyone can take part\, rather than disappear into a sea of muted rectangles. \nNo expertise is needed. You do not need fully formed opinions\, prior reading\, or a working relationship with Kant\, Hegel\, or Heidegger. Half-formed thoughts\, tentative objections\, and “I’m not sure\, but…” are very welcome. \nThis is not a lecture\, debate club\, or name-dropping contest. Just bring curiosity\, kindness\, and a willingness to think out loud. \nThe goal is a good conversation\, not a final answer. \n\n\nOnline Meetup Link:See https://www.meetup.com/exeter-philosophy-meetup-group/events/314596136/ \n\n\nThe topics for the week are: \n\n\n\nThe Stranger Who Has Seen Ice\n\nWhen a stranger tells us something beyond our experience\, should we protect ourselves through scepticism—or risk believing something extraordinary? \nImagine meeting someone from a distant place who describes something you have never seen. They tell you that water can become solid without becoming thick or muddy first. It simply changes into a transparent block when the temperature falls. \nNothing in your experience supports this. Water flows. Stones are solid. The stranger’s claim seems to confuse two entirely different kinds of thing. You know that travellers sometimes exaggerate\, misunderstand what they see\, or invent marvellous stories to impress their listeners. \nRefusing to believe them may therefore seem sensible. Yet the stranger may be telling the truth. If you reject every claim that exceeds your own experience\, your existing knowledge becomes a wall: it protects you from gullibility\, but also prevents the world from becoming larger. \nBaggini’s The Indian and the Ice asks how we should respond to testimony that is both unfamiliar and difficult to verify. A recent Reuters report offers a striking modern parallel. Researchers used artificial intelligence and advanced imaging to read a carbonised scroll that had remained closed for almost two thousand years. The fragile object could not speak in any ordinary sense\, yet new technology allowed an unfamiliar voice from the ancient world to be heard again. \nEvery conversation with a stranger contains a smaller version of this possibility. They may know a place\, experience\, language\, profession\, or way of life that lies beyond our usual world. Their unfamiliarity may make them less immediately credible—but it is also what allows them to tell us something genuinely new. \nHow much evidence should we require before allowing an unfamiliar claim to change our view? Is trusting a stranger an intellectual risk\, or is some willingness to risk error necessary for learning? And when does healthy scepticism become a refusal to discover anything we did not already expect? \n“A wise man\, therefore\, proportions his belief to the evidence.”David Hume – An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding \nSource:https://www.reuters.com/science/complete-text-carbonised-herculaneum-scroll-unlocked-first-time-2026-06-25/ \n\n\n\nRabbit Through the Camera\n\nIf technology translates a stranger’s words\, does that mean we have understood what they mean? \nImagine arriving in a city where you do not speak the language. A stranger points towards an animal and says a word you have never heard before. You assume the word means “rabbit”. \nBut perhaps it means “Look—a rabbit”. Perhaps it refers only to the visible part of the animal. Perhaps it means “food”\, “good luck”\, or “an animal crossing the road”. The stranger’s gestures and circumstances help\, but they do not guarantee that your translation captures the world as they understand it. \nThis is the problem explored in Baggini’s Rabbit\, based on W. V. O. Quine’s thought experiment about radical translation. Words do not exist alone. Their meanings are connected to culture\, habits\, assumptions\, relationships and other words. Translating a sentence may therefore be easier than translating the life within which it makes sense. \nReuters recently reported that police officers in Philadelphia are using body cameras capable of translating 50 languages in real time as the city welcomes visitors for the World Cup. The technology may allow strangers to communicate where previously they could not. But officials also acknowledged limits: legally important conversations still require certified human translators\, and the system may capture speech beyond the intended exchange. \nThe technology creates an intriguing possibility. A barrier that once prevented a conversation can now be crossed almost instantly. Yet instant translation may also produce an illusion of complete understanding. We may receive accurate words while missing humour\, fear\, social convention\, hesitation or cultural meaning. \nWhen we speak to strangers\, is understanding primarily a matter of translating their vocabulary—or of becoming curious about the world from which their words come? Can a machine translate a sentence without understanding either speaker? And might the small misunderstandings of conversation be part of the pleasure of discovering another person? \n“If a lion could talk\, we could not understand him.”Ludwig Wittgenstein – Philosophical Investigations \nSource:https://www.reuters.com/sports/soccer/philadelphia-police-deploy-real-time-translation-cameras-world-cup-2026-06-18/ \n\n\n\nThe Familiar Voice and the Unknown Witness\n\nShould we believe familiar\, established sources because they have earned our trust—or remain open to unknown voices that might tell us something the familiar sources have missed? \nImagine that two people give you conflicting accounts of the same event. \nOne is a familiar voice. You recognise their name\, understand their background and have relied on them before. They belong to an established institution with procedures\, editors and a reputation to protect. \nThe other is a stranger. They have no public record\, no recognised authority and no familiar badge of credibility. Yet they claim to have seen the event directly and insist that the established account is incomplete. \nTrusting the familiar source seems rational. A record of reliability matters. Institutions can correct errors\, verify claims and make their methods visible. But familiarity can also become intellectual habit. Established voices may share the same blind spots\, while unfamiliar people may possess knowledge unavailable to recognised authorities. \nBaggini’s The Rocking Horse Winner asks whether repeatedly being correct is enough to make someone a genuine source of knowledge. His No\, No raises a related problem: a person may hold a true and apparently justified belief\, yet arrive at it through luck or mistaken identity. \nReuters reported that the British government is considering requiring social-media platforms to make material from recognised public-service and other “trusted” news organisations easier to find. The proposal responds to widespread online misinformation\, but it also raises a philosophical question: who decides which voices deserve the advantage of being called trusted? \nWithout dependable sources\, public knowledge becomes vulnerable to fabrication\, impersonation and rumour. But a system that privileges only established voices may make it harder for new witnesses\, independent investigators or people outside powerful institutions to be heard. \nThe same tension appears in ordinary conversation. We may dismiss a stranger because they lack credentials\, or accept a familiar person because their voice feels safe. Yet neither familiarity nor novelty guarantees truth. \nShould trust be earned through a history of reliability\, judged anew for each claim\, or extended provisionally so that unfamiliar people have a chance to be heard? When does caution protect us from misinformation—and when does it trap us inside the limits of the people and institutions we already know? \n“It is wrong always\, everywhere\, and for anyone\, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.”W. K. Clifford – “The Ethics of Belief” \nSource:https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/uk-considers-forcing-social-media-firms-prioritise-trusted-news-2026-06-22/
URL:https://imperfectlycurious.com/event/five-seats-infinite-questions-4th-july-2026/
CATEGORIES:Five Seats Infinite Questions
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://bunny-wp-pullzone-jmfclxdp7w.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/meetup.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260625T200000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260625T213000
DTSTAMP:20260531T141439Z
CREATED:20260531T121951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260531T141439Z
UID:225-1782417600-1782423000@imperfectlycurious.com
SUMMARY:Film Club: 12 Angry Men
DESCRIPTION:Let’s explore the philosophical tensions running through the story: reason and emotion\, certainty and doubt\, fairness and bias\, individuality and social pressure\, truth and persuasion. Rather than treating the film as a puzzle with one smugly “correct” answer\, the session invites a shared inquiry into what it reveals about moral responsibility\, democratic disagreement\, and the challenge of listening well when the stakes are high and the room is getting far too warm. \nThe main point of reference will be the original black-and-white film — the Henry Fonda version\, naturally — though the more recent adaptation is absolutely fine too\, given how closely it follows the same story and script. Still\, when it comes to the presentation itself\, we’ll be keeping one foot firmly in the original jury room. \n\nExpect a warm welcome\, a short opening presentation to frame the themes\, and then an open conversation in which people can contribute as much or as little as they like. The aim is not to win the room\, but to think together in a spirit of curiosity\, generosity\, and critical reflection. \nNo prior philosophical qualification required – just curiosity\, a willingness to listen\, and an openness to multiple ways of knowing. \nThe meetup sessions often consists of the following: \n\nCheery welcomes to familiar faces and those that feel like chatting.\nA presentation about the topic\, lasts between 15-25 minutes (more or less). This is a way to provide some fundamentals.\nOpen floor to people that put up their hands to contribute their thoughts\, should they want to.\nA teary farewell as the clock announces a sad completion of the session; well-wishing until we all meet again.\n\n\nAlright folks! I want to give a little disclaimer – I’m not claiming to be an expert on the topics we’ll be discussing. My aim is to create a judgment-free zone where attendees can share thoughts and experiences openly. \nLet’s approach our conversations with open minds and a sense of curiosity\, knowing that we each bring unique backgrounds and perspectives. Please feel encouraged to express yourself in ways that reflect who you are\, and let’s all keep in mind that our words carry meaning for those around us. The intention of the meetup is to learn from one another\, so if anyone feels uncomfortable or misunderstood at any point\, please don’t hesitate to speak up. This way\, we can address things together and make sure everyone feels valued and included. \nThe goal is to explore ideas collaboratively\, without promoting any particular viewpoint. We may not find simple answers to the questions we face\, but by approaching them with empathy\, respect\, and inclusivity\, we can gain new insights and work towards positive change. \nLove our discussions? Show your support with a book or cup of coffee! Visit BuyMeACoffee (https://buymeacoffee.com/imperfectlycurious) to help fuel our passion for philosophy and books. Every contribution helps cover the costs of hosting\, reading\, and sharing ideas together. \n\n\nThursday\, Jun 25 · 8:00 PM to 9:30 PM CEST \n\n\nhttps://us06web.zoom.us/j/87617802188?pwd=CY9nZW2eKJPxv7txzFNiGWHgTDvnW8.1
URL:https://imperfectlycurious.com/event/film-club-12-angry-men/
CATEGORIES:The Curious Conversation Club
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://bunny-wp-pullzone-jmfclxdp7w.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/meetup_event.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260625T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260625T170000
DTSTAMP:20260625T172611Z
CREATED:20260625T171405Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260625T172611Z
UID:335-1782374400-1782406800@imperfectlycurious.com
SUMMARY:Five Seats Infinite Questions - 27th June 2026
DESCRIPTION:An intentionally small weekly online meetup for relaxed\, thoughtful philosophical conversation. \nEach event is built around 1-3 questions\, suggested by attendees or chosen by the host. We’ll explore the question until boredom or irritation intervenes. \nThe question list will be posted in the event comments on the Thursday before the meetup\, so everyone has time to think it over. \nThe group is intentionally small: around five open attendee places\, plus a small core group. The aim is to create a friendly space where everyone can take part\, rather than disappear into a sea of muted rectangles. \nNo expertise is needed. You do not need fully formed opinions\, prior reading\, or a working relationship with Kant\, Hegel\, or Heidegger. Half-formed thoughts\, tentative objections\, and “I’m not sure\, but…” are very welcome. \nThis is not a lecture\, debate club\, or name-dropping contest. Just bring curiosity\, kindness\, and a willingness to think out loud. \nThe goal is a good conversation\, not a final answer. \n\n\nOnline Meetup Link:See https://www.meetup.com/exeter-philosophy-meetup-group/events/314596135/ \n\n\nThe topics for the week are: \n\n\n\nWho Owns the Road to Space?\n\nWhen a private company becomes powerful enough to shape humanity’s future beyond Earth\, should space be treated as a market\, a commons\, or a trust held for everyone? \nSpaceX completed its stock-market debut on 12 June 2026\, selling shares at $135 each and raising an initial $75 billion at a valuation of approximately $1.75 trillion. After its underwriters exercised their option to buy additional shares\, the amount raised increased to $85.7 billion\, making it the largest initial public offering in history. \nDemand reportedly exceeded $250 billion\, and the shares rose by 19% on their first day of trading\, briefly pushing the company’s market value above $2 trillion. The listing allowed public investors to buy a financial stake in SpaceX\, but control remained highly concentrated: Elon Musk retained approximately 82% of the company’s voting power. \nThis matters because SpaceX is not simply another commercial business. Its rockets\, satellites and Starlink communications network have become important to governments\, armed forces\, businesses and communities around the world. The company is also developing technologies that may shape future exploration and settlement beyond Earth. \nImagine a newly discovered island separated from the mainland by a dangerous ocean. One company takes the risk of building the bridge\, constructing the boats\, drawing the maps and operating the only safe route across. Without its investment and ambition\, almost nobody could reach the island. \nThe company argues that ownership and profit are justified because it created access where none previously existed. But others reply that building the road does not establish a right to own the destination. The island was not created by the bridge-builder\, and its future may matter to everyone — including those who had no opportunity to invest. \nSpace creates the same tension. Private ambition may achieve what governments cannot or will not accomplish quickly. Investment\, competition and the prospect of profit can drive innovation. Yet once one company controls infrastructure essential to communications\, defence and exploration\, it begins to exercise something resembling public power without being publicly governed. \nDoes investing in the road create a moral right to control where it leads? If profit is what gets humanity into space\, should ownership follow? Or should space be treated as a common inheritance that no company or nation may rightfully dominate? \n“God gave the World to Men in Common.”John Locke – Second Treatise of Government \nSource:https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/spacex-ipo-raises-857-billion-underwriters-exercise-greenshoe-option-2026-06-15/ \n\n\n\nLife Dependency\n\nDoes someone else’s need give them a right to use your body? \nImagine waking up in a hospital bed to discover that you have been connected to another patient. This person cannot survive without your organs temporarily supporting theirs. If you disconnect yourself\, they will die. If you stay connected\, you must give up nine months of your life: your freedom\, comfort\, plans\, privacy\, and control over your own body. \nThe situation was not something you clearly agreed to. Perhaps there was a mistake. Perhaps you acted carelessly and ended up there through a mixture of irresponsibility and bad luck. Either way\, another human life is now dependent on you. \nThe question is not whether it would be generous\, noble\, or compassionate to stay connected. Perhaps it would be. The harder question is whether you can be morally required to do so. Does another person’s right to life include a right to make use of your body? Or does bodily autonomy mean that even saving a life cannot be demanded from you in this way? \nBaggini’s thought experiment draws on Judith Jarvis Thomson’s famous violinist argument about abortion. It forces us to separate two questions that are often tangled together: whether a dependent being has moral value\, and whether that value gives it a claim over another person’s body. \nAre we obliged to keep someone alive if doing so turns our own body into their life-support system? \n“The right to life consists not in the right not to be killed\, but rather in the right not to be killed unjustly.”Judith Jarvis Thomson – “A Defense of Abortion” \n\n\n\nFriendship: Persistence or Reciprocity?\n\nHow can we philosophers develop and grow adult friend connections in this day and age\, when people tend to be passive about proposing or organising in-person meetups\, or keep catch-up conversations inside modern communication apps? How much should we\, as conscious and intentional people\, persist — and when should we look elsewhere for new\, more aligned relationships? \nImagine someone who genuinely wants deeper adult friendships. They reach out\, suggest meeting\, organise plans\, and try to move conversations beyond occasional messages. Their friends respond warmly enough. They may say they would love to meet\, react positively to invitations\, or continue chatting online. Yet they rarely initiate anything themselves. \nNothing is openly wrong. There has been no argument\, betrayal\, or rejection. The friendships simply remain suspended in a strange middle ground: emotionally friendly\, digitally active\, but physically absent. One person keeps supplying the momentum while the others mostly respond. \nThis creates a difficult uncertainty. Perhaps the passive friends are busy\, anxious\, tired\, disorganised\, or simply accustomed to someone else taking the lead. Perhaps their lack of initiative does not mean a lack of care. Adult life is crowded\, and people may value a friendship without expressing that value in the same way. \nBut there is another possibility. The imbalance may reveal that the relationship matters more to one person than to the other. Continuing to pursue it may demonstrate loyalty and patience — or it may keep the initiator invested in connections that will never become genuinely mutual. \nModern communication makes the dilemma harder. Messaging apps can preserve the feeling of friendship with very little shared experience. A quick exchange\, a reaction\, or an occasional catch-up can keep a relationship technically alive while allowing both people to avoid the effort and vulnerability of meeting in person. \nHow can we tell the difference between a friendship that needs patience and one that has quietly become one-sided? Is caring about a friendship enough\, or must care be shown through initiative and reliable action? When does persistence become generosity\, and when does it become self-neglect? \nAnd if we turn elsewhere\, are we wisely making room for more reciprocal relationships — or giving up too quickly on people whose friendship simply takes a different form? \n“Friendship is essentially a partnership.”Aristotle – Nicomachean Ethics
URL:https://imperfectlycurious.com/event/five-seats-infinite-questions-27th-june-2026/
CATEGORIES:Five Seats Infinite Questions
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://bunny-wp-pullzone-jmfclxdp7w.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/meetup.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260620T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260620T190000
DTSTAMP:20260618T163345Z
CREATED:20260614T080812Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260618T163345Z
UID:307-1781978400-1781982000@imperfectlycurious.com
SUMMARY:Five Seats Infinite Questions – 20th June 2026
DESCRIPTION:An intentionally small weekly online meetup for relaxed\, thoughtful philosophical conversation. \nEach event is built around 1-3 questions\, suggested by attendees or chosen by the host. We’ll explore the question until boredom or irritation intervenes. \nThe question list will be posted in the event comments on the Thursday before the meetup\, so everyone has time to think it over. \nThe group is intentionally small: around five open attendee places\, plus a small core group. The aim is to create a friendly space where everyone can take part\, rather than disappear into a sea of muted rectangles. \nNo expertise is needed. You do not need fully formed opinions\, prior reading\, or a working relationship with Kant\, Hegel\, or Heidegger. Half-formed thoughts\, tentative objections\, and “I’m not sure\, but…” are very welcome. \nThis is not a lecture\, debate club\, or name-dropping contest. Just bring curiosity\, kindness\, and a willingness to think out loud. \nThe goal is a good conversation\, not a final answer. \n\n\nOnline Meetup Link:See https://www.meetup.com/exeter-philosophy-meetup-group/events/314596133/ \n\n\nThe topics for the week are: \n\n\n\nThe Hole in the Sum of the Parts\n\nWhen we say that a country\, government\, or institution has made a choice\, are we treating a complex system as though it were a single person? \nImagine two tourists asking to be shown Oxford University. A taxi driver takes them past the colleges\, libraries\, museums\, gardens\, and academic buildings. At the end of the tour\, they complain that he has shown them all the parts\, but not the university itself. \nTheir mistake is to assume that the university must be one more object\, hidden somewhere beyond its colleges and libraries. But the university is not an extra building. It is the organised institution made up of those places\, people\, rules\, relationships\, traditions\, and activities. \nBaggini uses this example to introduce what Gilbert Ryle called a category mistake: treating something as if it belongs to one kind of category when it belongs to another. \nThe same problem may arise when we say that “a nation chose war” or “the government wanted revenge”. A country does not possess a single mind. Its actions emerge from leaders\, advisers\, soldiers\, institutions\, economic interests\, public opinion\, historical narratives\, and systems of authority. \nIf no individual completely controls the whole\, where does collective intention reside? And if an atrocity is produced by thousands of people each performing one small role\, who is morally responsible for the final result? \nhttps://www.reuters.com/world/france-floats-revamp-eu-diplomacy-with-reinforced-role-kallas-paper-shows-2026-06-11/ \n“A purchaser who has inspected all the instruments may still ask to be shown ‘the team-spirit’; but he would be voicing a category-mistake.”Gilbert Ryle – The Concept of Mind \n\n\n\nRationality Demands\n\nCan reason lead us towards evil\, or does evil begin when reason is separated from human feeling? \nImagine a highly rational person who is persuaded by an apparently flawless argument that she should detonate a bomb and kill innocent people. She feels that the conclusion must be wrong\, but she cannot identify any mistake in the reasoning. \nShe has always believed that rational arguments should be followed rather than rejected because of instinct\, discomfort\, or emotion. Yet now reason appears to demand something monstrous. Should she trust the argument\, or trust the moral horror she feels towards its conclusion? \nThe thought experiment challenges the reassuring belief that rationality must always lead us towards what is good. Intelligent people have repeatedly constructed elaborate arguments for war\, persecution\, repression\, and sacrifice. Their reasoning may be internally coherent while beginning from distorted assumptions\, false information\, or values that treat human beings as instruments. \nPerhaps reason does not decide what we should ultimately value. It may only show us how to achieve the goals supplied by fear\, loyalty\, ambition\, ideology\, or compassion. \nWhen reason and conscience point in different directions\, which should we trust? Is moral feeling an unreliable obstacle to rational judgement\, or an essential safeguard against rationally organised cruelty? \nhttps://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-bets-air-war-it-stumbles-battlefield-2026-06-03/ \n“Reason is\, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.”David Hume – A Treatise of Human Nature \n\n\n\nLast Resort\n\nWhen people believe every peaceful option has failed\, can violence begin to look not only understandable\, but necessary? \nImagine Britain has been occupied by a brutal foreign regime. Conventional resistance has failed. The army has been defeated\, outside help is not coming\, and the occupying power appears secure. \nA small resistance movement concludes that it cannot win a direct military struggle. Its only hope is to make occupation so costly\, disruptive\, and frightening that the regime eventually withdraws. The fighters are willing to die\, but ordinary attacks seem ineffective. They begin considering suicide missions designed to cause maximum disruption and terror. \nThe scenario is disturbing because it asks us to imagine people like ourselves arriving at conclusions we usually associate with fanaticism or barbarity. Baggini’s point is not that such violence becomes morally right\, but that people may reach it through fear\, humiliation\, loyalty\, desperation\, and the belief that no other means remain. \nOnce a person sees themselves primarily as a defender of a people\, a nation\, or a cause\, acts that once seemed unthinkable may begin to appear courageous or necessary. The phrase “last resort” can explain how violence becomes imaginable — but it can also become a dangerous way of excusing anything. \nDoes understanding why people resort to terror risk justifying it\, or is understanding essential if we are to judge it honestly? \nhttps://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanon-ceasefire-raises-hopes-progess-iran-deal-2026-06-04/ \n“He who fights with monsters should look to it that he himself does not become a monster.”Friedrich Nietzsche – Beyond Good and Evil
URL:https://imperfectlycurious.com/event/five-seats-infinite-questions-20th-june-2026/
CATEGORIES:Five Seats Infinite Questions
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://bunny-wp-pullzone-jmfclxdp7w.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/meetup.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260613T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260613T190000
DTSTAMP:20260611T105731Z
CREATED:20260608T191410Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260611T105731Z
UID:289-1781373600-1781377200@imperfectlycurious.com
SUMMARY:Five Seats Infinite Questions - 13th June 2026
DESCRIPTION:An intentionally small weekly online meetup for relaxed\, thoughtful philosophical conversation. \nEach event is built around 1-3 questions\, suggested by attendees or chosen by the host. We’ll explore the question until boredom or irritation intervenes. \nThe question list will be posted in the event comments on the Thursday before the meetup\, so everyone has time to think it over. \nThe group is intentionally small: around five open attendee places\, plus a small core group. The aim is to create a friendly space where everyone can take part\, rather than disappear into a sea of muted rectangles. \nNo expertise is needed. You do not need fully formed opinions\, prior reading\, or a working relationship with Kant\, Hegel\, or Heidegger. Half-formed thoughts\, tentative objections\, and “I’m not sure\, but…” are very welcome. \nThis is not a lecture\, debate club\, or name-dropping contest. Just bring curiosity\, kindness\, and a willingness to think out loud. \nThe goal is a good conversation\, not a final answer. \n\n\nOnline Meetup Link: see https://www.meetup.com/exeter-philosophy-meetup-group/events/314596131/ \n\n\nThe topics for the week are: \n\n\n\nDuties Done\n\nIs doing your best enough\, or are you responsible for whether things actually work out? \nImagine four children who promise their mother that they will write to her regularly while travelling. Each one tries in a different way. One writes letters but casually gives them to unreliable people to post. Another writes and posts them\, but does so carelessly: wrong boxes\, wrong stamps\, wrong details. A third writes and posts them properly\, but the postal system fails. A fourth not only writes and posts them properly\, but also phones to check whether they have arrived — and still\, through no fault of their own\, the letters never reach home. \nNone of the letters arrive. From the mother’s point of view\, the promise has failed. But from the children’s point of view\, the cases feel morally different. Some were careless. Some were unlucky. Some did almost everything that could reasonably be expected. \nThe thought experiment asks where responsibility ends. If you sincerely try to fulfil a duty\, but the result does not happen\, have you done your duty? Or does morality require not just good intentions and reasonable effort\, but actual success? \nThis becomes much more serious when the stakes rise. Forget letters home: imagine sending a warning\, cancelling an attack\, delivering medicine\, or protecting someone from danger. How much checking is enough? At what point does “I tried” stop being a defence? \nAre we judged by our intentions\, our efforts\, our care\, or by what actually happens? \n“Ought implies can.”Immanuel Kant – Critique of Pure Reason \n\n\n\nBank Error in Your Favour\n\nIf luck hands you something that is not yours\, when does keeping it become stealing? \nImagine going to a cash machine and asking for £100. Instead\, it gives you £10\,000\, while your bank account is only charged £100. You did not hack the machine. You did not threaten anyone. You did not intend to take what was not yours. The money simply appeared in your hands because of someone else’s mistake. \nAt first\, you expect the bank to notice and ask for it back. But weeks pass. Nobody contacts you. The temptation grows. The bank is wealthy. It is probably insured. It was their error\, not yours. Compared with their vast profits\, the loss is tiny; compared with your life\, the money could make a real difference. \nBut then the uncomfortable thought remains: the money is not yours. The fact that the mistake benefited you does not make it a gift. What began as an accident may become a deliberate act the moment you decide to keep quiet and spend it. \nThe thought experiment explores self-serving reasoning. We are often excellent lawyers for our own desires. We find arguments that sound moral — no one is hurt\, they can afford it\, it was their fault — when really we may simply want permission to keep the cash. \nIs taking advantage of someone else’s mistake a stroke of luck\, or a quieter form of theft? \n“It is easy for a man to do a wrong thing\, and hard for him to know that he has done it.”Henry Sidgwick – The Methods of Ethics \n\n\n\nFuture Shock\n\nCan your past self make binding decisions for the person you become? \nImagine that\, years ago\, someone made a solemn declaration: “If I ever become the kind of person who believes this\, supports that\, or lives in that way\, stop me.” Perhaps they even wrote it down. At the time\, they meant it sincerely. Their younger self was clear\, passionate\, and certain. \nTwenty years later\, they have changed. Their politics\, values\, relationships\, and sense of self are different. What once seemed unthinkable now seems reasonable. Then an old friend appears\, determined to hold them to their earlier instruction. After all\, if we accept that people can make living wills or advance decisions about their future medical treatment\, why not other serious instructions from the past? \nThe question is unsettling because we often treat ourselves as continuous beings. We make promises\, sign contracts\, marry\, borrow money\, plan careers\, and prepare for future illness. Yet we also change. Sometimes dramatically. The person who made the promise may no longer feel identical to the person who must live with it. \nThis thought experiment asks how much authority a past self should have over a future self. Are we bound by who we once were\, or does the present person have the right to overrule the past? \nWhen we change deeply\, are we still keeping promises to ourselves — or being governed by a stranger who happens to be our younger self? \n“There is properly no simplicity in it at one time\, nor identity in different.”David Hume – A Treatise of Human Nature \n\n\n\nSquaring the Circle\n\nCan an all-powerful God do the logically impossible\, or is nonsense still nonsense even for God? \nImagine a philosopher speaking with God. God declares that he is all-powerful: there is nothing he cannot do. The philosopher begins with an easy challenge. Can God turn everything blue into red\, and everything red into blue? God does so. \nThen comes the harder challenge: can God create a square circle? \nGod says yes — and produces a square. The philosopher objects. That is not a square circle; it is simply a square. God could rename it a circle\, but that would not make it genuinely circular. The challenge is not to change the meanings of words\, but to create something that is both a square and a circle at the same time. \nThe puzzle is that a square circle is not merely hard to make. It appears to be logically impossible. A square is a four-sided figure. A circle has no sides. To ask for a four-sided figure with no sides may not be asking for a miraculous object\, but failing to ask for anything coherent at all. \nThis thought experiment asks what we mean by omnipotence. If God cannot create a square circle\, is that a limit on divine power? Or does it show that logical contradictions are not “things” to be created in the first place? Many traditional believers\, including Thomas Aquinas\, argue that God can do all things that are possible\, but contradictions are not possible things. \nSo perhaps the real question is not whether God has enough power\, but whether words can trick us into imagining a task where there is only confusion. \nDoes omnipotence mean the power to do absolutely anything\, or the power to do anything that can meaningfully be done? \n“Whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence.”Thomas Aquinas – Summa Theologiae
URL:https://imperfectlycurious.com/event/five-seats-infinite-questions-13th-june-2026/
CATEGORIES:Five Seats Infinite Questions
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://bunny-wp-pullzone-jmfclxdp7w.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/meetup.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260606T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260606T190000
DTSTAMP:20260608T191016Z
CREATED:20260604T155653Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260608T191016Z
UID:279-1780768800-1780772400@imperfectlycurious.com
SUMMARY:Five Seats Infinite Questions – 6th June 2026
DESCRIPTION:An intentionally small weekly online meetup for relaxed\, thoughtful philosophical conversation. \nEach event is built around 3–6 questions\, suggested by attendees or chosen by the host. We’ll spend up to around 20 minutes per question\, depending on how the conversation flows. The question list will be posted in the event comments on the Thursday before the meetup\, so everyone has time to think it over. \nThe group is intentionally small: around five open attendee places\, plus a small core group. The aim is to create a friendly space where everyone can take part\, rather than disappear into a sea of muted rectangles. \nNo expertise is needed. You do not need fully formed opinions\, prior reading\, or a working relationship with Kant\, Hegel\, or Heidegger. Half-formed thoughts\, tentative objections\, and “I’m not sure\, but…” are very welcome. \nThis is not a lecture\, debate club\, or name-dropping contest. Just bring curiosity\, kindness\, and a willingness to think out loud. \nThe goal is a good conversation\, not a final answer. \n\n\nOnline Meetup Link: see https://www.meetup.com/exeter-philosophy-meetup-group/events/314596130/ \n\n\nThe topics for the week are: \n\n\n\nWhen Peace Needs Weapons\n\nWhen the world feels less secure\, is military strength a necessary condition of peace\, or does preparing for war help create the very danger it is meant to prevent? \nRecent discussions around NATO have focused on whether Europe can rely as heavily on the United States as it has in the past\, and whether European countries should spend far more on defence. Poland has argued that NATO members should reach defence spending of 5% of GDP by 2030\, while SIPRI reported that European military spending rose sharply in 2025. Behind the budgets is a deeper question: is Europe entering a new period where peace depends less on shared rules and more on deterrence\, rearmament and strategic independence? \nImagine a neighbourhood where one powerful neighbour has always helped keep order. Now that neighbour seems less reliable\, and everyone else begins buying stronger locks\, alarms and weapons. Each household says it only wants safety. Yet the more everyone prepares\, the more dangerous the neighbourhood begins to feel. \nIs rearmament a responsible response to danger\, or a sign that politics has failed? Can peace be preserved through strength\, or does treating security as an arms race make trust impossible? And if defence spending rises\, what duties are being displaced elsewhere — health\, welfare\, climate\, education\, or future debt? \n“Standing Armies shall in time be totally abolished.”Immanuel Kant – Toward Perpetual Peace \nsource: https://www.reuters.com/world/nato-must-spend-5-gdp-defence-by-2030-poland-says-2026-05-06/ \n\n\n\nWho Owns the Sky?\n\nWhen a private company becomes powerful enough to shape humanity’s future beyond Earth\, should space be treated as a market\, a commons\, or a trust held for everyone? \nSpaceX’s proposed blockbuster IPO has raised huge economic questions about valuation\, investor access and private control of strategic technology. Reuters reported that the company set a $135 share price for a planned IPO that could value it at about $1.75 trillion\, while earlier filings highlighted both losses and Elon Musk’s continuing control. But beyond the financial spectacle lies a more philosophical question: if companies build the rockets\, satellites and infrastructure that make space accessible\, do they gain a special moral claim over that future? \nImagine a bridge being built to a newly discovered island. One company funds the bridge\, builds the boats\, controls the maps and charges the tolls. Without that company\, almost no one could get there. But once the island becomes reachable\, everyone starts asking whether it was ever right for one company to control the gateway. \nShould space be opened mainly by private ambition and investment\, or governed as a shared human inheritance? If profit is what gets us there\, should ownership follow? And when a private company becomes essential to communications\, defence\, exploration and perhaps settlement\, does it begin to resemble public power? \n“God gave the World to Men in Common.”John Locke – Second Treatise of Government \nSource: https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/spacex-sets-135-price-blockbuster-ipo-upending-wall-street-convention-2026-06-03/ \n\n\n\nAfter the Centre Gives Way\n\nWhen old political loyalties weaken\, is democracy becoming more alive\, or entering a more dangerous historical period? \nRecent UK politics has shown signs of fragmentation. Reform UK has raised more in donations than Labour and the Conservatives\, while the Greens and other parties have also benefited from dissatisfaction with the traditional party system. LSE analysis has argued that Britain’s two-party era is ending\, with Brexit still reshaping the political landscape. Across Europe\, similar patterns are visible: mainstream parties are weaker\, anti-establishment movements are stronger\, and politics increasingly feels less like a contest over policy and more like a struggle over identity\, belonging and historical direction. \nImagine a town where two old clubs used to organise almost everything. People complained about them\, but they also knew where they stood. Now the clubs have lost trust\, and many smaller groups have appeared. Some bring fresh energy and neglected voices. Others thrive on anger\, suspicion and nostalgia. The town is more plural\, but also harder to hold together. \nIs political fragmentation a healthy correction to stale democracy\, or a warning sign that shared reality is breaking down? Are voters discovering new choices\, or are they losing faith in the possibility of common life? And are we simply living through another electoral cycle\, or the beginning of a different historical period? \n“What prepares men for totalitarian domination… is the fact that loneliness… has become an everyday experience.”Hannah Arendt – The Origins of Totalitarianism \nSource: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2026/jun/04/reform-uk-raising-millions-more-than-other-parties-donation-figures-show/ \n\n\n\nThe Lifeboat\n\nAre we responsible for suffering we did not cause\, but could easily help to prevent? \nImagine a lifeboat floating safely after a disaster. There is plenty of room on board. There are enough supplies. The people already in the boat are not in immediate danger. They could rescue a drowning woman nearby without any serious risk to themselves. \nBut the self-appointed captain objects. If they save her\, everyone will have to give up a little comfort: perhaps an extra biscuit\, a small luxury\, a slightly easier time. He argues that they did not push her into the water. Her drowning is not their fault. Why should they disturb their own peace to solve a problem they did not create? \nThe scenario is simple\, but its target is much larger. The lifeboat stands for affluent societies\, or perhaps for any comfortable person surrounded by preventable suffering. If we have enough to help others without seriously harming ourselves\, is refusing to help merely ungenerous\, or is it morally wrong? \nThis thought experiment challenges the comforting difference between killing and letting die. We usually think it is worse to actively harm someone than to fail to save them. But if rescue is easy\, the need is urgent\, and the cost to us is small\, does that distinction still protect us? \nAre we morally entitled to enjoy our extra biscuit while someone else drowns? \n“If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening\, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance\, we ought\, morally\, to do it.”Peter Singer – “Famine\, Affluence\, and Morality” \n\n\n\nLife Dependency\n\nDoes someone else’s need give them a right to use your body? \nImagine waking up in a hospital bed to discover that you have been connected to another patient. This person cannot survive without your organs temporarily supporting theirs. If you disconnect yourself\, they will die. If you stay connected\, you must give up nine months of your life: your freedom\, comfort\, plans\, privacy\, and control over your own body. \nThe situation was not something you clearly agreed to. Perhaps there was a mistake. Perhaps you acted carelessly and ended up there through a mixture of irresponsibility and bad luck. Either way\, another human life is now dependent on you. \nThe question is not whether it would be generous\, noble\, or compassionate to stay connected. Perhaps it would be. The harder question is whether you can be morally required to do so. Does another person’s right to life include a right to make use of your body? Or does bodily autonomy mean that even saving a life cannot be demanded from you in this way? \nBaggini’s thought experiment draws on Judith Jarvis Thomson’s famous violinist argument about abortion. It forces us to separate two questions that are often tangled together: whether a dependent being has moral value\, and whether that value gives it a claim over another person’s body. \nAre we obliged to keep someone alive if doing so turns our own body into their life-support system? \n“The right to life consists not in the right not to be killed\, but rather in the right not to be killed unjustly.”Judith Jarvis Thomson – “A Defense of Abortion” \n\n\n\nMozzarella Moon\n\nWhen does healthy scepticism become a conspiracy-shaped refusal to believe? \nImagine someone tells you that the moon is made of cheese. Not just any cheese: mozzarella. They know this sounds absurd\, but they are ready for every objection. The moon landings? Faked. Moon rocks? Suppressed or planted. Scientists? Paid off\, threatened\, or part of the cover-up. Telescopes? Not powerful enough to show the truth. The fact that almost nobody believes it? Exactly what you would expect if the conspiracy were working. \nAt first\, the belief seems easy to dismiss. But the troubling part is that it can be made to fit the evidence if enough surrounding beliefs are rearranged. Every challenge becomes part of the story. Every lack of proof becomes evidence of concealment. The theory survives not because it is strong\, but because it has become slippery. \nBaggini uses this absurd example to explore a serious problem: evidence rarely forces only one possible conclusion. Our beliefs form a web. If we are determined enough\, we can protect almost any claim by changing the rest of the web around it. This helps explain why conspiracy theories can feel so persuasive from the inside and so ridiculous from the outside. \nThe question is not simply why some people believe strange things. It is how any of us decide when a belief is reasonable\, when evidence is good enough\, and when a theory has become so over-protected that it no longer deserves our trust. \nAre conspiracy theories irrational because they contradict the evidence\, or because they explain the evidence too easily? \n“Any statement can be held true come what may\, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system.”W. V. O. Quine – “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” \n\n\n\n\nOverview of session: \nAfter the Centre Gives Way — Discussion Summary\nThe conversation explored whether political fragmentation is a sign of democratic renewal or a warning that shared public life is weakening. A key theme was the effect of electoral systems\, especially how first-past-the-post tends to reinforce two large parties and may discourage collaboration\, while more proportional or multi-party systems can allow more voices to be represented but may also make decision-making slower or less stable. \nThe group discussed how traditional political loyalties\, especially class-based voting patterns\, appear to be giving way to more issue-based concerns such as healthcare\, rights\, immigration\, economics and identity. This raised the question of whether democracy is becoming more responsive to real differences in society\, or whether it is becoming more vulnerable to populism\, misinformation and political disillusionment. \nA significant part of the discussion focused on the influence of wealth\, media and public perception. The group considered whether extremely wealthy individuals and media organisations can distort democratic debate\, especially when money\, attention and online engagement shape what people see and believe. This led to questions about whether voters are genuinely free and informed\, or whether modern politics is increasingly driven by manipulation\, fear and spectacle. \nThe conversation also touched on free speech and its limits. Participants considered how democracies should distinguish between robust disagreement\, offensive speech and language that encourages harm or intimidation. This connected back to the wider question of whether political fragmentation makes open debate healthier by allowing more voices\, or more dangerous by amplifying division. \nComparisons were made between two-party and multi-party systems\, including examples from Belgium and other European contexts. The group noted that coalition politics can encourage compromise and broader representation\, but may also produce deadlock or instability. Smaller political units were also discussed as potentially more democratic\, though the group recognised that borders rarely match neatly with language\, culture\, ethnicity\, resources or identity. \nThe final part of the discussion moved towards cultural heritage and belonging. The group explored how identity is shaped by family background\, place\, language\, migration and shared culture\, often in ways people only partly recognise. This raised a further question about democracy itself: whether diverse societies can build enough shared identity to govern well together\, or whether political fragmentation reflects deeper uncertainty about who “we” are. \nOverall\, the discussion suggested that the centre giving way can be read in two ways. It may represent a healthier demand for more voices\, more local influence and more honest representation. But it may also signal declining trust\, weakened common ground and a move into a more unstable political era.
URL:https://imperfectlycurious.com/event/five-seats-infinite-questions-6th-june-2026/
CATEGORIES:Five Seats Infinite Questions
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://bunny-wp-pullzone-jmfclxdp7w.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/meetup.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260530T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260530T190000
DTSTAMP:20260531T132322Z
CREATED:20260524T130830Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260531T132322Z
UID:212-1780164000-1780167600@imperfectlycurious.com
SUMMARY:Five Seats Infinite Questions - 30th May 2026
DESCRIPTION:The topics for the week are: \n\n\n\nThe Torture Option\n\nCan doing something cruel ever be justified if it prevents something even worse? \nImagine a man has planted a bomb that will kill hundreds\, perhaps thousands\, of innocent people. He has been captured\, but he refuses to reveal where the bomb is hidden. Torturing him will not work. He is too committed\, too prepared\, too hardened. \nBut there is another possibility. His innocent son has also been captured. The interrogators believe that\, if the father is forced to watch his son being tortured\, he will break and reveal the bomb’s location. The son has done nothing wrong. He is not a suspect\, not an accomplice\, not a threat. He is simply a person who might be made to suffer in order to save many others. \nThis is where the thought experiment becomes especially uncomfortable. It does not ask whether torture is pleasant\, noble\, or admirable. It asks whether an act we normally regard as morally forbidden could become permissible under extreme pressure. If refusing to torture means allowing many innocent people to die\, is that refusal principled courage\, or moral self-protection at others’ expense? \nThe case also raises a danger. Once we allow torture in one exceptional case\, can we really contain it? Rules against cruelty exist partly because human beings are very good at convincing themselves that this time\, just this once\, the emergency is special. \nAre there moral lines that must never be crossed\, or does the scale of the consequences sometimes force us across them? \n“The question is not\, Can they reason?\, nor Can they talk? but\, Can they suffer?”Jeremy Bentham – An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation \n\n\n\nThe Lifeboat\n\nAre we responsible for suffering we did not cause\, but could easily help to prevent? \nImagine a lifeboat floating safely after a disaster. There is plenty of room on board. There are enough supplies. The people already in the boat are not in immediate danger. They could rescue a drowning woman nearby without any serious risk to themselves. \nBut the self-appointed captain objects. If they save her\, everyone will have to give up a little comfort: perhaps an extra biscuit\, a small luxury\, a slightly easier time. He argues that they did not push her into the water. Her drowning is not their fault. Why should they disturb their own peace to solve a problem they did not create? \nThe scenario is simple\, but its target is much larger. The lifeboat stands for affluent societies\, or perhaps for any comfortable person surrounded by preventable suffering. If we have enough to help others without seriously harming ourselves\, is refusing to help merely ungenerous\, or is it morally wrong? \nThis thought experiment challenges the comforting difference between killing and letting die. We usually think it is worse to actively harm someone than to fail to save them. But if rescue is easy\, the need is urgent\, and the cost to us is small\, does that distinction still protect us? \nAre we morally entitled to enjoy our extra biscuit while someone else drowns? \n“If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening\, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance\, we ought\, morally\, to do it.”Peter Singer – “Famine\, Affluence\, and Morality” \n\n\n\nLife Dependency\n\nDoes someone else’s need give them a right to use your body? \nImagine waking up in a hospital bed to discover that you have been connected to another patient. This person cannot survive without your organs temporarily supporting theirs. If you disconnect yourself\, they will die. If you stay connected\, you must give up nine months of your life: your freedom\, comfort\, plans\, privacy\, and control over your own body. \nThe situation was not something you clearly agreed to. Perhaps there was a mistake. Perhaps you acted carelessly and ended up there through a mixture of irresponsibility and bad luck. Either way\, another human life is now dependent on you. \nThe question is not whether it would be generous\, noble\, or compassionate to stay connected. Perhaps it would be. The harder question is whether you can be morally required to do so. Does another person’s right to life include a right to make use of your body? Or does bodily autonomy mean that even saving a life cannot be demanded from you in this way? \nBaggini’s thought experiment draws on Judith Jarvis Thomson’s famous violinist argument about abortion. It forces us to separate two questions that are often tangled together: whether a dependent being has moral value\, and whether that value gives it a claim over another person’s body. \nAre we obliged to keep someone alive if doing so turns our own body into their life-support system? \n“The right to life consists not in the right not to be killed\, but rather in the right not to be killed unjustly.”Judith Jarvis Thomson – “A Defense of Abortion” \n\n\n\nPre-emptive Justice\n\nCan it be just to punish someone for something they have not yet done? \nImagine a police force with technology so advanced that it can predict future crimes. It can identify who will steal\, attack\, or even murder before the act takes place. The system seems to work. Crime drops dramatically. Lives are saved. Victims who would have suffered are spared. \nThe people identified by the system are arrested before they commit the crime. The authorities insist this is not cruel\, but merciful. A future murderer might receive treatment\, supervision\, or a shorter detention\, rather than being allowed to kill someone and then spend life in prison. Better still\, the intended victim remains alive. \nBut something feels deeply troubling. The person has not yet committed the crime. They have not chosen\, acted\, or harmed anyone. We may fear what they are predicted to do\, but can prediction replace guilt? If we punish someone before the act\, are we protecting society — or destroying the idea that people are responsible for what they actually do? \nThe thought experiment asks us to weigh safety against justice\, prevention against freedom\, and prediction against moral agency. A society with pre-emptive justice might be safer\, but it may also become one in which people are treated as future criminals before they have had the chance to choose otherwise. \nAre we responsible for the future we are predicted to create\, or only for the actions we actually take? \n“It was a fundamental rule of Precrime methodology that the existence of a majority logically implied a corresponding minority report.”Philip K. Dick – “The Minority Report” \n\n\n\nThe Invisible Gardener\n\nIs a belief meaningful if nothing could ever count against it? \nImagine two explorers who find a beautiful clearing in the jungle. The flowers are healthy\, the grass is neat\, and everything looks carefully tended. One explorer says\, “There must be a gardener looking after this place.” The other is sceptical. \nThey watch and wait\, but no gardener appears. Perhaps the gardener is invisible\, says the believer. They set up traps\, but nothing is caught. Perhaps the gardener is intangible. They listen for sounds\, but hear nothing. Perhaps the gardener is silent. Bit by bit\, every test that might reveal the gardener fails — but each failure is explained away. \nEventually\, the sceptic asks: what is the difference between an invisible\, silent\, intangible gardener who leaves no trace\, and no gardener at all? \nThe thought experiment is aimed at religious belief\, but it reaches much wider. We often protect our beliefs by adjusting them whenever evidence goes against us. A failed prediction becomes a deeper mystery. A missing sign becomes a hidden sign. The absence of evidence becomes part of the story. At some point\, a belief may become so flexible that it cannot be challenged by anything. \nBut if nothing could ever show a belief to be false\, what does it really claim? \nAre some beliefs acts of faith beyond evidence\, or do meaningful claims need to risk being wrong? \n“A fine brash hypothesis may thus be killed by inches\, the death by a thousand qualifications.”Antony Flew – “Theology and Falsification” \n\n\n\nMozzarella Moon\n\nWhen does healthy scepticism become a conspiracy-shaped refusal to believe? \nImagine someone tells you that the moon is made of cheese. Not just any cheese: mozzarella. They know this sounds absurd\, but they are ready for every objection. The moon landings? Faked. Moon rocks? Suppressed or planted. Scientists? Paid off\, threatened\, or part of the cover-up. Telescopes? Not powerful enough to show the truth. The fact that almost nobody believes it? Exactly what you would expect if the conspiracy were working. \nAt first\, the belief seems easy to dismiss. But the troubling part is that it can be made to fit the evidence if enough surrounding beliefs are rearranged. Every challenge becomes part of the story. Every lack of proof becomes evidence of concealment. The theory survives not because it is strong\, but because it has become slippery. \nBaggini uses this absurd example to explore a serious problem: evidence rarely forces only one possible conclusion. Our beliefs form a web. If we are determined enough\, we can protect almost any claim by changing the rest of the web around it. This helps explain why conspiracy theories can feel so persuasive from the inside and so ridiculous from the outside. \nThe question is not simply why some people believe strange things. It is how any of us decide when a belief is reasonable\, when evidence is good enough\, and when a theory has become so over-protected that it no longer deserves our trust. \nAre conspiracy theories irrational because they contradict the evidence\, or because they explain the evidence too easily? \n“Any statement can be held true come what may\, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system.”W. V. O. Quine – “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”
URL:https://imperfectlycurious.com/event/five-seats-infinite-questions-30th-may-2026/
CATEGORIES:Five Seats Infinite Questions,Philosophy
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://bunny-wp-pullzone-jmfclxdp7w.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/meetup.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260523T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260523T190000
DTSTAMP:20260524T125517Z
CREATED:20260516T181838Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260524T125517Z
UID:196-1779559200-1779562800@imperfectlycurious.com
SUMMARY:Five Seats Infinite Questions – 23rd May 2026
DESCRIPTION:23rd May 2026\n\nThe topics for the week are: \n\n\n\nBursting the Soap Bubble\n\nDo people believe what is true\, or what their little world has taught them to see as true? \nImagine a secluded group of people who have been raised to believe that soap operas are not fiction\, but reality. For them\, Coronation Street\, EastEnders\, Neighbours\, and similar programmes are not entertainment: they are documentaries showing how the world really is. \nOne member of the group escapes and visits the places he has seen on television. To his shock\, he discovers that the world he believed in was staged. The street is a set. The characters are actors. The reality he had lived inside was carefully constructed. \nBut when he returns and tells the others\, they reject him. They say he has been deceived by the outside world. They would rather preserve the familiar illusion than accept the disturbing truth. \nThe problem is not simply that they are ignorant. It is that their whole sense of reality has been shaped by the only world they know. This raises uncomfortable questions about our own lives. Do we also live inside invisible bubbles made from our media\, upbringing\, friendships\, politics\, habits\, and fears? If someone tried to show us a larger truth\, would we recognise it — or would we dismiss them as mad? \nAre we truth-seekers\, or are we mostly defenders of the world that already makes sense to us? \n“How could they\, if they had been prevented from moving their heads all their lives?“Plato – Republic\, Book VII \n\n\n\nThe Hole in the Sum of the Parts\n\nWhen we ask what something “really is”\, are we looking for the wrong kind of thing? \nImagine two tourists visiting Oxford. They ask a taxi driver to show them the university. The driver takes them around the city: colleges\, libraries\, museums\, gardens\, halls\, and academic buildings. At the end\, the tourists are annoyed. They say: “You showed us the colleges\, the libraries\, and the museums — but where is the university?” \nTheir mistake is understandable\, but revealing. They assume the university must be an extra object\, somewhere behind or above all its parts. But Oxford University is not a single hidden building. It is the organised whole made up of those colleges\, libraries\, people\, rules\, traditions\, relationships\, and activities. \nThis is what Gilbert Ryle called a category mistake: treating something as though it belongs to one kind of category when it actually belongs to another. Baggini uses the example to open up a wider philosophical problem. We often speak as though things like “the mind”\, “the self”\, “society”\, or “the university” must be single objects. But perhaps some things are not objects at all. They may be patterns\, systems\, practices\, relationships\, or ways of organising many parts. \nSo when we ask “What is it really?”\, we may need to pause and ask: what sort of thing are we expecting to find? A physical object? A role? A function? A relationship? A process? If we look for the wrong kind of answer\, we may turn a perfectly sensible question into a puzzle of our own making. \nAre some philosophical problems created because language makes complex patterns sound like simple things? \n“A purchaser who has inspected all the instruments may still ask to be shown ‘the team-spirit’; but he would be voicing a category-mistake.”Gilbert Ryle – The Concept of Mind \n\n\n\nWhen No One Wins\n\nWhen every option is terrible\, is morality about keeping one’s hands clean\, or about reducing the harm that will occur? \nImagine a soldier who is ordered to commit an atrocity against an innocent civilian. He knows the command is morally abhorrent. Yet he also knows that\, if he refuses\, he will be killed and someone else will carry out the same act with even greater cruelty. \nHe faces a nightmare. If he obeys\, he becomes directly involved in something monstrous. If he refuses\, the victim still suffers\, perhaps more\, and he dies as well. He may be able to reduce the harm\, but only by doing what seems plainly wrong. \nAre there situations where every available option is morally stained? Can someone do the “least bad” thing and still be guilty of wrongdoing? Or are there acts that must never be performed\, no matter what consequences follow? \n“The best thing to do on the whole … involves doing something wrong.” Bernard Williams – Morality: An Introduction to Ethics \n\n\n\nPicasso on the Beach\n\nIs a work of art less valuable if it does not endure\, or can its fleeting nature make it more precious? \nPicture yourself walking along a beach when you see Pablo Picasso drawing a remarkable image in the sand. It is unmistakably his work: inventive\, beautiful\, alive with artistic force. But the tide is coming in. Within minutes\, the sea will wash it away forever. \nYou cannot preserve the drawing itself. At best\, you might take a photograph. Should you feel devastated that a genuine Picasso will vanish? Or is the fact that it was brief\, fragile\, and experienced in the moment part of what gives it its value? \nPaintings\, sculptures\, and buildings are often treated as objects to be protected from decay. But performances\, songs\, and moments of beauty disappear naturally. Perhaps not all art is meant to last. Perhaps our urge to preserve it says as much about our fear of loss as it does about artistic value. \n“The work of art is complete only as it works in the experience of others.”John Dewey – Art as Experience  \n\n\n\nThe Free Speech Booth\n\nIs free speech mainly the freedom to speak\, or the freedom to communicate meaningfully with others? \nImagine a government proudly announcing that it now permits complete freedom of speech. Citizens may criticise the state\, insult its leaders\, or express any view they like. There is only one condition: they must do so inside special soundproof booths where nobody else can hear them. \nThe government claims it has honoured free expression. After all\, people may say whatever they wish. Yet something seems deeply wrong. Speech is not merely the private production of words. It is communication. It is protest\, persuasion\, challenge\, satire\, and shared public life. \nWhat does freedom of speech really protects? Is it only the ability to form and utter opinions? Or does it also include the right to address others\, to influence society\, and to be heard? At the same time\, once we say speech needs an audience\, we must confront difficult limits: slander\, incitement\, abuse\, and panic can cause real harm. \n“The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is\, that it is robbing the human race.”John Stuart Mill\, On Liberty \n\n\n\nTill Death Us Do Part\n\nIs trust an irrational gamble\, or is it a necessary risk without which the best parts of life are impossible?  \nTwo people are about to marry. They genuinely want a loving partnership based on trust and mutual care. Each believes that\, if both put the relationship first\, they will be happier together than they could be by acting selfishly. \nBut a worry creeps in. What if one person sacrifices and the other quietly looks after themselves? Then the trusting partner may be exploited. So each thinks: perhaps the safest course is to hold something back\, protect my own interests\, and avoid being the fool. \nThe tragedy is that\, if both think this way\, the marriage becomes weaker from the start. What is individually “rational” produces a worse outcome for both. This is a version of the prisoner’s dilemma: cooperation would benefit everyone\, but fear of betrayal makes cooperation fragile. \nDoes trust always involve vulnerability? Can it be guaranteed in advance? Without it\, does love\, friendship\, and community become thin and defensive. \n“’Tis profitable for us both\, that I shou’d labour with you to-day\, and that you shou’d aid me to-morrow.”David Hume\, A Treatise of Human Nature\, Book III \n\n\n\n\nOverview of session: \nThe session explored two questions: first\, whether free speech is merely the right to speak or also the right to communicate meaningfully with others; second\, whether trust is an irrational gamble or a necessary risk in relationships\, community\, and professional life. \n1. Free Speech: Speaking\, Being Heard\, and Causing Harm\nThe group began by discussing whether free speech only protects the ability to express an opinion\, or whether it also requires access to an audience. There was broad agreement that speech is not just the private production of words: it is often an attempt to communicate\, challenge\, persuade\, protest\, or participate in public life. \nAt the same time\, participants recognised that speech cannot be treated as consequence-free. The discussion moved towards the limits of expression\, especially where speech becomes abusive\, discriminatory\, slanderous\, threatening\, or harmful. There was some agreement that free speech does not mean freedom from criticism\, offence\, or social consequences. \nA recurring tension was the difference between free speech and appropriate speech. Some participants emphasised that people may have the right to say something while others have the right to object\, criticise\, or distance themselves from it. Others focused on how context\, intention\, power\, and social norms affect whether speech is judged acceptable. \nPower dynamics were part of the discussion. The group considered whether everyone can speak equally freely in practice\, even if they are formally granted the same rights. Professional settings\, public discourse\, and interpersonal relationships were used as examples of spaces where speech may be shaped by status\, consequences\, and social expectations. \nThe group also discussed how ideas of offensive or acceptable language change over time. What one generation or culture sees as normal may be seen by another as inappropriate or harmful. This led to a broader reflection on whether standards of speech are fixed\, or whether they evolve with society. \n2. Trust: Vulnerability\, Risk\, and Relationship\nThe second discussion focused on whether trust can ever be guaranteed\, and whether it is rational to trust when betrayal is always possible. There was broad agreement that trust necessarily involves vulnerability: to trust someone is to accept that they could disappoint\, exploit\, or hurt you. \nParticipants discussed trust not only in romantic relationships\, but also in friendships\, families\, workplaces\, communities\, and professional contexts. Trust was seen as risky\, but also as something without which relationships become guarded\, defensive\, and limited. \nA key point of agreement was that trust cannot be fully secured in advance. It must be built\, tested\, damaged\, repaired\, or lost through experience. Past betrayal can make trust harder\, but not necessarily impossible. Trust was also described as a kind of privilege: when someone trusts us\, they are placing something vulnerable in our hands. \nThe group distinguished between trusting others and trusting oneself. One view was that self-trust is different because we have more direct access to our own intentions\, fears\, and patterns of behaviour than we do to another person’s inner life. However\, even self-trust may not be perfect\, since people can misjudge themselves too. \n3. Confidentiality\, Responsibility\, and Ethical Limits\nThe discussion of trust moved into professional confidentiality\, especially in mental health and support contexts. Participants considered cases where someone is trusted with private information but may also have a responsibility to act if serious harm is possible. \nThere was agreement that confidentiality is central to trust in professional support roles\, but that it is not absolute. The group discussed the ethical difficulty of deciding when maintaining trust must give way to preventing harm to the person themselves or to others. \nThis part of the conversation highlighted a broader tension: trust depends on privacy and reliability\, but moral responsibility may sometimes require disclosure\, intervention\, or shared decision-making. \nAreas of Agreement\nThe group seemed broadly to agree that: \n\nFree speech is more than silently holding an opinion; it involves communication with others.\nFree speech does not mean freedom from challenge\, criticism\, offence\, or consequences.\nContext\, intention\, power\, and social norms matter when judging speech.\nTrust always involves some vulnerability.\nTrust cannot be completely guaranteed in advance.\nRelationships and communities would become thinner and more defensive without trust.\nConfidentiality is important\, but may have ethical limits where serious harm is involved.\n\nAreas of Tension or Disagreement\nThe main unresolved tensions were: \n\nWhether free speech includes a right to be heard\, or only a right not to be silenced.\nHow much weight should be given to intention when speech causes offence.\nWho gets to decide what counts as appropriate or harmful speech.\nWhether powerful people are genuinely constrained by speech norms\, or whether consequences fall unevenly.\nWhether trust is rational despite vulnerability\, or whether it always involves a leap beyond evidence.\nWhere the boundary lies between respecting confidentiality and preventing harm.\n\nConclusions Reached\nNo final conclusions were reached\, but the discussion produced some shared insights. \nOn free speech\, the group leaned towards the view that speech is not meaningful if it is completely isolated from an audience. However\, they also recognised that once speech enters public or interpersonal life\, it becomes entangled with harm\, responsibility\, power\, and changing social norms. \nOn trust\, the group seemed to conclude that trust cannot be made risk-free. It is vulnerable by nature\, but that vulnerability is also what makes meaningful relationships possible. Trust may therefore be less like a guarantee and more like a necessary risk: fragile\, imperfect\, but essential to love\, friendship\, work\, and community.
URL:https://imperfectlycurious.com/event/five-seats-infinite-questions-23rd-may-2026/
CATEGORIES:Five Seats Infinite Questions
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://bunny-wp-pullzone-jmfclxdp7w.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/meetup.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260516T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260516T190000
DTSTAMP:20260516T181349Z
CREATED:20260511T062326Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260516T181349Z
UID:167-1778954400-1778958000@imperfectlycurious.com
SUMMARY:Five Seats Infinite Questions - 16th May 2026
DESCRIPTION:16th May 2026\n\nThe topics for the week are: \n\n\n\nWhen No One Wins\n\nWhen every option is terrible\, is morality about keeping one’s hands clean\, or about reducing the harm that will occur? \nImagine a soldier who is ordered to commit an atrocity against an innocent civilian. He knows the command is morally abhorrent. Yet he also knows that\, if he refuses\, he will be killed and someone else will carry out the same act with even greater cruelty. \nHe faces a nightmare. If he obeys\, he becomes directly involved in something monstrous. If he refuses\, the victim still suffers\, perhaps more\, and he dies as well. He may be able to reduce the harm\, but only by doing what seems plainly wrong. \nAre there situations where every available option is morally stained? Can someone do the “least bad” thing and still be guilty of wrongdoing? Or are there acts that must never be performed\, no matter what consequences follow? \n“The best thing to do on the whole … involves doing something wrong.” Bernard Williams – Morality: An Introduction to Ethics \n\n\n\nPicasso on the Beach\n\nIs a work of art less valuable if it does not endure\, or can its fleeting nature make it more precious? \nPicture yourself walking along a beach when you see Pablo Picasso drawing a remarkable image in the sand. It is unmistakably his work: inventive\, beautiful\, alive with artistic force. But the tide is coming in. Within minutes\, the sea will wash it away forever. \nYou cannot preserve the drawing itself. At best\, you might take a photograph. Should you feel devastated that a genuine Picasso will vanish? Or is the fact that it was brief\, fragile\, and experienced in the moment part of what gives it its value? \nPaintings\, sculptures\, and buildings are often treated as objects to be protected from decay. But performances\, songs\, and moments of beauty disappear naturally. Perhaps not all art is meant to last. Perhaps our urge to preserve it says as much about our fear of loss as it does about artistic value. \n“The work of art is complete only as it works in the experience of others.”John Dewey – Art as Experience  \n\n\n\nThe Free Speech Booth\n\nIs free speech mainly the freedom to speak\, or the freedom to communicate meaningfully with others? \nImagine a government proudly announcing that it now permits complete freedom of speech. Citizens may criticise the state\, insult its leaders\, or express any view they like. There is only one condition: they must do so inside special soundproof booths where nobody else can hear them. \nThe government claims it has honoured free expression. After all\, people may say whatever they wish. Yet something seems deeply wrong. Speech is not merely the private production of words. It is communication. It is protest\, persuasion\, challenge\, satire\, and shared public life. \nWhat does freedom of speech really protects? Is it only the ability to form and utter opinions? Or does it also include the right to address others\, to influence society\, and to be heard? At the same time\, once we say speech needs an audience\, we must confront difficult limits: slander\, incitement\, abuse\, and panic can cause real harm. \n“The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is\, that it is robbing the human race.”John Stuart Mill\, On Liberty \n\n\n\nTill Death Us Do Part\n\nIs trust an irrational gamble\, or is it a necessary risk without which the best parts of life are impossible?  \nTwo people are about to marry. They genuinely want a loving partnership based on trust and mutual care. Each believes that\, if both put the relationship first\, they will be happier together than they could be by acting selfishly. \nBut a worry creeps in. What if one person sacrifices and the other quietly looks after themselves? Then the trusting partner may be exploited. So each thinks: perhaps the safest course is to hold something back\, protect my own interests\, and avoid being the fool. \nThe tragedy is that\, if both think this way\, the marriage becomes weaker from the start. What is individually “rational” produces a worse outcome for both. This is a version of the prisoner’s dilemma: cooperation would benefit everyone\, but fear of betrayal makes cooperation fragile. \nDoes trust always involve vulnerability? Can it be guaranteed in advance? Without it\, does love\, friendship\, and community become thin and defensive. \n“’Tis profitable for us both\, that I shou’d labour with you to-day\, and that you shou’d aid me to-morrow.”David Hume\, A Treatise of Human Nature\, Book III \n\n\n\nThe Good Bribe\n\nIs it ever right to do something corrupt in order to achieve a clearly good result? \nSuppose a wealthy and morally dubious businessman approaches a prime minister with an offer. He will donate a vast sum of money to provide clean water for hundreds of thousands of people\, but only if he is awarded a national honour in return. \nThe prime minister recoils. This is plainly a bribe. Honours are meant to recognise merit\, not be purchased. Yet the proposed donation would do immense good. If the prime minister refuses\, countless people may continue to suffer from preventable disease and lack of clean water. If he accepts\, he compromises public integrity for a beneficial result. \nThis sets two moral instincts against one another – one says that outcomes matter most: saving lives should outweigh procedural purity. The other says that institutions depend on fairness\, trust\, and principles that should not be sold\, even for a good cause. If leaders start bending rules whenever they believe the consequences are favourable\, where does it stop? \n“By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever…”Jeremy Bentham\, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation \n\n\n\nEating Tiddles\n\nIs eating a dead pet genuinely wrong\, or does it merely violate a powerful cultural taboo? \nA family cat is accidentally killed by a car. Its owner\, practical and committed to avoiding waste\, reasons that the animal is now simply dead meat. The family already eats other animals. Why should this one be treated differently? Rather than bury it\, she cooks it for dinner. \nMost people feel a strong jolt of disgust at this idea. But why? If eating animals is acceptable\, and if the cat has already died\, what exactly is wrong? Is the objection moral\, or is it cultural and emotional? We eat pigs\, cows\, chickens\, and fish\, yet many people are horrified by the thought of eating a pet. The scenario asks whether our moral reactions are guided by reason\, or by habits\, symbols\, and taboos we rarely examine. \nDoes naming and loving an animal change what we owe it\, even after death? Is a pet no longer “food” because it has been part of a bond of trust and affection? \n“Moral judgments were better predicted by affective reactions than by appraisals of harmfulness.”Jonathan Haidt\, Silvia Helena Koller\, and Maria G. Dias\, “Affect\, Culture\, and Morality\, or Is It Wrong to Eat Your Dog?” \n\n\n\n\nResponses: \n\n\n1. Eating Tiddles\nA central theme was that pets occupy a different moral category from animals typically regarded as food. Several participants suggested that this difference is created through affection\, naming\, dependence\, and trust. A pet relationship was described as involving responsibility and a reciprocal bond: once an animal is cared for as a companion\, eating it may feel less like avoiding waste and more like betraying that relationship\, even after death. \nThe group also questioned whether these reactions are universal. Cultural and economic contexts were raised in which eating an animal one has kept may not carry the same moral weight\, especially where survival pressures are greater. Historical examples from wartime suggested that what seems unthinkable in ordinary circumstances can shift under necessity. This led to reflection on how modern societies increasingly anthropomorphise pets and treat them as emotionally significant individuals rather than useful household animals. \nParticipants explored whether objections to eating pets arise from moral reasoning or from instinctive disgust. The conversation touched on moral foundations such as harm\, loyalty\, disgust\, and autonomy\, suggesting that people may object for different reasons rather than from a single consistent principle. The group considered whether such intuitions are innate\, socially learned\, or some mixture of both. \nThe conversation broadened into questions about power\, species hierarchy\, and compartmentalisation. It was suggested that humans often rank species according to perceived intellectual and emotional capacities rather than physical strength. This was linked to the way people mentally separate those they care about from those they permit themselves to exploit\, opening onto animal rights more generally\, including arguments about animal suffering and testing. \nUrban and rural experiences were also contrasted. It was noted that people closer to farming and animal husbandry often encounter the practical realities of slaughter\, breeding\, and culling more directly than city dwellers. The example of keeping chickens illustrated how the distinction between companion and food animal can become blurred in everyday rural life. \nOverall\, the group did not arrive at a single verdict on whether eating a dead pet is wrong. Instead\, the discussion suggested that the issue sits at the intersection of grief\, trust\, social taboo\, cultural practice\, necessity\, and moral consistency. “Eating Tiddles” exposed how our treatment of animals often depends not only on what they are\, but on the relationships we form with them and the stories we tell about those relationships.
URL:https://imperfectlycurious.com/event/five-seats-infinite-questions-16th-may-2026/
CATEGORIES:Five Seats Infinite Questions
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260509T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260509T190000
DTSTAMP:20260511T111955Z
CREATED:20260507T072304Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260511T111955Z
UID:107-1778349600-1778353200@imperfectlycurious.com
SUMMARY:Five Seats\, Infinite Questions - 9th May 2026
DESCRIPTION:9th May 2026\n\nThe topics for the week are: \n\n\n\nChildren\, social media and online safety\n\nShould children’s freedom online be limited for their own good\, or does protection risk becoming over-control? \nThe UK is piloting social media bans\, curfews and app time limits with families to test effects on children’s sleep\, schoolwork and family life. Reuters \n“Nature wants children to be children before they are men.” – Rousseau\, ** Émile\, or On Education\, Book II \nRousseau reminds us that childhood is not simply a smaller version of adulthood. The question is whether restrictions protect children’s development\, or whether they prevent young people from gradually learning judgement. \n\n\n\nMuseums\, tourists and who pays for culture\n\nWho are museums for: local citizens\, global visitors\, taxpayers\, source communities\, or future generations? \nThe UK has considered charging international tourists to enter some national museums\, sparking debate about access\, funding and contested artefacts.Reuters \n“Being able to use the senses\, to imagine\, think\, and reason…” – Martha Nussbaum\, Women and Human Development\, central capabilities list. \nNussbaum’s capabilities approach treats imagination\, thought and cultural experience as part of a flourishing human life. This makes museum access more than a question of ticket prices. \n \n\n\n\nEU AI rules and Big Tech pressure\n\nShould fast-moving technologies be regulated cautiously\, or should societies accept more risk in order to innovate? \nEU countries and lawmakers reached a provisional deal to revise AI rules\, easing some obligations and delaying parts of the regime\, while critics said the changes favoured Big Tech.Reuters \n“Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life.” – Hans Jonas\, The Imperative of Responsibility. \nJonas argues that powerful technologies create duties towards the future. AI regulation becomes philosophical because the consequences may be broad\, long-term and difficult to reverse. \n\n\n\nLocal elections and public trust\n\nIs voting mainly about choosing representatives\, expressing identity\, sending a warning\, or building the common good? \nElections across England\, Scotland and Wales are being treated as a major test for Labour and for the wider party system\, with smaller parties gaining attention.The Guardian \n“Municipal institutions… impart a taste for freedom and a knowledge of the art of being free.” – Alexis de Tocqueville\, Democracy in America. \nTocqueville saw local politics as a school of democratic life. That makes local elections more than a party contest: they are also about habits of citizenship and trust. \n\n\n\nEurope’s energy relief and who should be helped first\n\nWhen prices rise\, should governments help everyone a little\, or focus help on those most at risk? \nEuropean governments have used energy relief measures to protect households and businesses\, but economists and ratings analysts warn that broad support can strain public finances and may be less fair than targeted help.Reuters \n“The central idea is that society as a whole should be arranged so as to benefit the least advantaged.” –Paraphrase of John Rawls’ difference principle\, from A Theory of Justice \nRawls’ view pushes us to ask how policies look from the position of the least advantaged. Energy relief is therefore not only about affordability\, but about fairness in public spending. \n\n\n\nAssisted dying and Parliament\n\nAt the end of life\, how should society balance personal autonomy with protection of the vulnerable? \nThe assisted dying debate in England and Wales continues to raise questions about autonomy\, safeguards\, palliative care and protection for vulnerable people. \nReuters \n“Act in such a way as to treat humanity… always as an end and never merely as a means.” – Immanuel Kant\, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. \nKant’s language of human dignity can be used by people on different sides of this debate. The deeper issue is what it means to respect a person as an end in themselves. \n\n\n\n\nResponses: \n\n\n1. Local elections and public trust\nQuestion: Is voting mainly about choosing representatives\, expressing identity\, sending a warning\, or building the common good? \nThe conversation framed voting as more complicated than simply choosing a representative. Participants reflected on how different electoral systems shape people’s sense of whether voting matters. Two-party systems in countries such as the US\, UK and Canada were contrasted with more fragmented systems\, such as Italy’s\, where many parties compete. This raised the question of whether voters feel genuinely represented or forced into imperfect choices.  \nOne perspective was that voting can feel ineffective when people believe their vote has little practical impact. Low participation was linked to voter disenfranchisement\, especially where people feel elections do not meaningfully change outcomes. In this view\, voting is not only a civic act but also a measure of public trust: when trust weakens\, turnout and engagement may fall.  \nAnother view focused on the distinction between voting and electing. Participants noted that\, in representative democracies\, people may vote for parties or candidates whose later actions do not fully match voters’ intentions. This suggests that voting can become an indirect or ambiguous expression: it may signal preference\, identity\, dissatisfaction or compromise\, rather than a clear mandate.  \nThe discussion also considered whether compulsory voting could improve democratic outcomes. One argument was that mandatory voting\, possibly with penalties\, might encourage people to become better informed and lead to stronger representation. Belgium’s system was mentioned as an example where voting is compulsory but citizens may still cast a blank vote. This introduced the idea that voting can be a civic duty while still allowing space for protest or non-endorsement.  \nOverall\, the group seemed to treat voting as serving several purposes at once: choosing representatives\, expressing values or identity\, signalling discontent\, and participating in a shared democratic system. The unresolved tension was whether current voting systems actually help build the common good\, or whether they often leave citizens feeling detached from political outcomes. \n2. Children\, social media and online safety\nQuestion: Should children’s freedom online be limited for their own good\, or does protection risk becoming over-control? \nThis was the most developed part of the discussion\, with a clear split between those emphasising protection and those warning against over-restriction. \nOne perspective was that social media poses serious risks to children’s development and wellbeing. Participants acknowledged that online platforms create real problems for children\, while also questioning whether bans or restrictive measures would be effective. There was support for thinking through restrictions carefully\, including their likely effectiveness and possible side effects\, rather than assuming that limitation automatically solves the problem.  \nAnother view warned that outright bans on social media for teenagers could have unintended consequences. Since today’s young people have grown up with digital technology\, removing access could worsen problems such as isolation\, depression\, violence or suicide rather than solve them. This perspective suggested that online life is now deeply embedded in teenage social development\, making complete bans potentially unrealistic or harmful.  \nOthers pushed back against over-restrictive approaches by arguing that children should be taught critical thinking from a young age. Online safety education was compared with financial literacy\, advertising awareness and other life skills. From this perspective\, the goal should be resilience and judgement\, not simply control.  \nAt the same time\, the group recognised serious harms such as cyberbullying. The discussion referred to cases where cyberbullying had contributed to suicide\, and participants noted how anonymity online can encourage harmful behaviour. Spain’s mandatory reporting of both in-person bullying and cyberbullying was mentioned as one possible approach. This perspective supported intervention\, but not necessarily blanket bans.  \nAnother important divide concerned who should be responsible. One view was that parents should take primary responsibility for managing children’s social media use\, rather than relying mainly on government regulation. This framed online activity as similar to other risky behaviours where parental guidance is necessary. By contrast\, others discussed the role of platforms\, moderation and regulation\, especially when harmful content\, data privacy or algorithmic exposure are involved.  \nData privacy was also raised as a concern\, particularly around how platforms collect\, use and delete personal information. The group then considered the burden placed on content moderators\, including low pay and trauma from reviewing harmful material. Participants questioned whether platforms should be treated more like publishers\, with responsibility for content\, or utilities\, with a more neutral role. A notice-board analogy was used to argue that platform owners should take responsibility for removing harmful material once identified.  \nOverall\, the discussion did not reduce the issue to “freedom versus safety”. Instead\, it exposed several overlapping questions: whether bans work\, whether parents or governments should lead\, what responsibility platforms have\, how to protect children without isolating them\, and whether education may be more effective than prohibition. \n3. Museums\, tourists and who pays for culture\nQuestion: Who are museums for: local citizens\, global visitors\, taxpayers\, source communities\, or future generations? \nThe museum discussion centred on access\, fairness and the purpose of cultural institutions. Participants considered whether museums should be open equally to international visitors or whether residents and taxpayers should receive special treatment. \nOne perspective emphasised museums as shared cultural spaces that should be accessible to everyone. At the same time\, participants questioned whether museums may still be perceived as elite institutions. This raised the issue of whether formal openness is enough if some people feel socially or economically excluded from museum culture.  \nAnother perspective focused on the practical question of funding. Participants noted that in the UK\, smaller museums often charge nominal fees while larger museums are often free. This points to a tension between universal access and financial sustainability: free admission may widen access\, but museums still need funding for staffing\, conservation and programming.  \nThe example of Bath’s resident card system was mentioned\, where local residents receive free access to local facilities while visitors pay. This model suggests that museums may owe something particular to local citizens and taxpayers\, especially when public money supports them. At the same time\, it creates a distinction between insiders and outsiders\, raising questions about whether global visitors should face higher barriers to cultural access.  \nMuseum access in Munich and other European cities was also discussed. Participants noted that museums often charge admission but may offer free access during special events. This offered a middle-ground model: museums can charge admission while still creating periodic opportunities for wider public access.  \nThe discussion also touched on cross-cultural experience. Some participants expressed concern that restricting international access could reduce the enriching role museums play in connecting people across cultures. This perspective sees museums not only as local amenities but as global educational institutions.  \nThe summary does not show much detailed discussion of source communities or future generations\, but those ideas are implicit in the wider question of cultural stewardship. Museums are not only entertainment venues or tourist attractions; they also preserve objects\, histories and knowledge over time. The unresolved question was how to balance these roles fairly: serving residents\, welcoming visitors\, respecting cultural origins\, and preserving collections for the future. \nCross-cutting themes\nAcross all three topics\, the conversation repeatedly returned to the same underlying dilemma: how much should institutions protect\, guide or structure people’s choices\, and how much freedom or responsibility should individuals retain? \nIn the voting discussion\, this appeared as a tension between civic duty and political choice. In the social media discussion\, it appeared as protection versus over-control. In the museum discussion\, it appeared as open access versus managed access. In each case\, the group seemed less interested in a single fixed answer than in the balance between individual freedom\, collective responsibility\, institutional power and fairness.
URL:https://imperfectlycurious.com/event/five-seats-infinite-questions-9th-may-2026/
CATEGORIES:Five Seats Infinite Questions
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://bunny-wp-pullzone-jmfclxdp7w.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/meetup.png
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260321T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260321T190000
DTSTAMP:20260318T143111Z
CREATED:20260318T143111Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260318T143111Z
UID:83-1774116000-1774119600@imperfectlycurious.com
SUMMARY:Saturday Chats
DESCRIPTION:A short free flowing discussion about anything you want and which other people are willing to play ball with.
URL:https://imperfectlycurious.com/event/saturday-chats/
CATEGORIES:Philosophy
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